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Conventional wisdom maintains that security 
concerns are the primary motivation for states to 
seek nuclear weapons. Indeed, history has shown 
that the predominant decisions to go nuclear 
(starting from the U.S., the Soviet Union, China, 
Israel, Pakistan, and to North Korea) appear to 
be motivated by security concerns. Yet, the fact 
there have been nuclear-capable states with 
precarious security concerns that have decided 
not to seek nuclear weapons serve to challenge the 
aforementioned conventional wisdom. Moreover, 
further research and case-by-case study coupled 
with understanding of the fact that each state in 
the world has different security condition and 
challenges show that security concerns are, in 
reality, not always the primary motivation.. 
Kebijaksanaan konvensional menyatakan bahwa 
masalah keamanan adalah faktor utama yang 
mendorong sebuah negara untuk mengembangkan 
senjata nuklir.  Sejarah memang telah 
menunjukkan bahwa pelbagai keputusan untuk 
mengembangkan senjata nuklir (mulai dari 
Amerika Serikat, Uni Soviet, Cina, Israel, 
Pakistan, sampai Korea Utara) tampaknya dipicu 
oleh masalah keamanan. Namun, fakta bahwa ada 
beberapa negara berkemampuan nuklir yang 
menghadapi masalah keamanan genting tetapi 
tidak memutuskan untuk mengembangkan senjata 
nuklir seakan menantang validitas kebijaksanaan 
konvensional tersebut. Selanjutnya, penelitian dan 
studi kasus ditambah dengan pemahaman bahwa 
setiap negara di dunia memiliki kondisi dan 
tantangan keamanan yang berbeda menunjukkan 
bahwa masalah keamanan, pada kenyataannya, 
tidak selalu menjadi faktor utama. 
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Introduction 
Conventional wisdom in 
international relations avers that 
security concerns are the primary 
motivation for states to seek nuclear 
weapons. That is, “states seek to 
develop nuclear weapons when they 
face a significant military threat to 
their security that cannot be met 
through alternative means; if they do 
not face such threats, they will 
willingly remain non-nuclear states 
(Sagan, 1996).”  It is indeed difficult 
to refute that states are motivated to 
seek (and willing to go through the 
arduous, complex, and costly steps) 
the production of nuclear weapons in 
order to ensure the most important of 
their raison d'état—security. Of equal 
importance, history has shown that 
the predominant decisions to go 
nuclear (starting from the U.S., the 
Soviet Union, China, Israel, Pakistan, 
and to North Korea) appear to be 
motivated by security concerns 
(Sagan, 1996).  Consequently, the 
security model (i.e., realism theory) 
has often been presented as the 
explanation behind a state’s decision 
to procure nuclear weapons. 
This paper, using a case-by-
case study, will attempt to test the 
cogency of the security model and 
answer the following research 
question: 
“Are security concerns the primary 
motivation for states to seek nuclear 
weapons (and by extension, other 
weapons of mass destruction)?” 
Analysis of Case-by-Case Study 
India  
India and China had a 
vitriolic relationship in the early 60s. 
They went to war in 1962, resulting in 
an Indian defeat, including the lost of 
territory to China, and the possibility 
of future conflict caused by retaliation 
or border dispute. Two years later, in 
1964, China successfully tested its 
nuclear weapon proclaiming its 
military superiority in both 
conventional and unconventional 
weapons, and thereby, putting India’s 
security at risk.  
If the security concerns are 
the primary motivation for states to 
seek nuclear weapons, it should 
follow that India—a state that has 
advanced nuclear capabilities and 
currently under an existential security 
threat—would embark on a crash 
weapons program. Nonetheless, 
history shows that India chose not to 
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do so; and the weapon program was 
delayed due to discrepancy of elite 
decision makers in the state 
machinery (Samaddar, 2005; Sagan, 
1996).   
Ten years later, in 1974, 
when China had no longer posed a 
serious threat to India’s security, 
India detonated its first nuclear bomb. 
An important thing to note is that 
Indian military personnel and the 
Defense Minister were not involved 
in the initial decision to prepare the 
nuclear device or in the final decision 
to test the bomb.  
Normally, if security 
concerns are the primary motivation, 
the military would play an important 
role in the making, testing, and 
storing of the nuclear weapons. 
Arguably, this shows that the security 
issue was of “secondary importance 
(Sagan, 1996).”   
More importantly, domestic 
support for India’s leader at that time, 
Indira Gandhi, had fallen to an all-
time low. Hence, she needed to 
initiate a spectacular event “to divert 
public attention from [her] domestic 
woes” and to improve her domestic 
support (Epstein, 1977; Potter, 1982; 
Sagan, 1996).  Nothing works best, 
she believed, then detonating a 
nuclear bomb given the contemporary 
trend that dictates possessing nuclear 
weapons are considered to be the sign 
of modernity and prestige, thus they 
could be used to restore the nation’s 
support, confidence, and pride.   
South Africa  
When Cuban military forces 
backed by the Soviet Union (SU)—a 
nuclear power—intervened in Angola 
in 1975, the South African 
government felt its security was at 
risk. “Six atomic weapons were 
therefore constructed between 1980 
and 1989 (Sagan, 1996).”   
Prima facie, South Africa’s 
motivation to have nuclear weapons 
was to ensure its security considering 
the bombs could serve as deterrent 
against the SU. Yet, further scrutiny 
shows that South Africa’s nuclear 
program was started back in 1971, 
four years before the Cuban military’s 
intervention—four years before the 
(supposed) threat emerged (Sagan, 
1996).  
Despite having no 
significant security threats in 1971, 
South Africa decided to start 
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researching nuclear devices. South 
Africa’s decision to embark on a 
nuclear program was motivated by 
prestige and international standing.  
That is, South Africa’s 
scientists would like to enhance their 
standing in international scientific 
circles by successfully producing 
PNEs to be utilized in mining 
situations (Sagan, 1996).  It is 
important to note that the mining 
industry in South Africa has been one 
of the most important and profitable 
industries with powerful lobby to the 
government (South Africa's Official 
Gateway, 2008).   
Scientists’ motivation for 
prestige, backed by a coalition of the 
elites within the government of South 
Africa and mining industry, had not 
only made the nuclear weapons 
program of South Africa 
technologically feasible but also 
politically and economically. It is also 
worth noting that when South Africa 
had successfully produced its first 
nuclear device, the device was “too 
large to be deliverable by a military 
aircraft (Sagan, 1996).”   
This occurred because the 
military was not consulted about the 
bomb design, bolstering the notion 
that the South Africa nuclear weapons 
program was not motivated by 
external security threat but for 
domestic motivations (Sagan, 1996).   
Furthermore, South Africa’s 
decision to give up all its weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) capability 
(including abandonment of the 
Project Coast—a clandestine 
biological and chemical weapons 
program) reiterates the notion that 
security was not the primary 
motivation of South Africa’s WMD 
program (The Henry L. Stimson 
Center, 1999).   
In the view that having 
WMD could be a guarantee for the 
current and future of South Africa’s 
security, it would be illogical and 
improvident for South Africa to 
voluntarily give up its WMD 
program. If anything, this shows that 
security concerns and a policy of 
deterrence against the SU were never 
the primary motivation of South 
Africa’s WMD program; they merely 
served as justifications.  
France 
During the 1956 Suez Crisis, 
the SU threatened to use nuclear force 
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against France if France failed to 
withdraw from Egypt, which was the 
SU’s (uneasy) ally. This situation was 
exacerbated by the fact that the U.S.’s 
nuclear guarantee was no longer 
reliable considering SU’s second 
strike capability (Sagan, 1996).   
In addition, the U.S. shared 
an opposite view with France vis-à-
vis the Suez Crisis, and demanded 
France's withdrawal. It would be 
logical for France, therefore, to 
initiate the weapons program given 
that France has the technology, 
economic, and political means to do 
so. And it would be logical to say, at 
this time, that security concerns are 
the primary motivation for France to 
seek nuclear weapons.  
However, further study 
shows that the rationale above might 
be tenuous. France had already 
decided to initiate the weapons 
program two years before the Suez 
Crisis—two years before SU threat to 
use nuclear force.  
Furthermore, if using the 
argument that SU poses a grave 
danger to France’s security, and the 
U.S. provides unreliable security 
guaranty to all countries in Europe 
(including France), then why did only 
France decide to initiate the weapons 
program? Why other nuclear-capable 
states in Europe, faced with similar 
security threats at the time, not also 
develop nuclear weapons?  
This arguably because only 
France’s leaders value the nuclear 
weapons highly (relative to other 
European leaders) and regard the 
nuclear weapons’ symbolic 
significance (Sagan, 1996).  
In retrospect, despite 
winning World War II, France was a 
liberated victor whose military 
capabilities and international standing 
were relatively middling compared to 
other victors namely the U.S., the SU, 
and the British (a France rival). For 
that reason, French leaders sought to 
restore the national greatness and 
international standing.  
Accordingly, the First 
French Five-Year plan outlined the 
necessity of ensuring that in 10 years’ 
time France will still be an important 
country. In other words, restoring the 
nation’s grandeur and regain 
international respect and prestige are 
the primary motivation for France to 
seek nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1996).   
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Just as siege cannons, in the 
medieval era, were status symbols 
(and science breakthrough) and all 
kings wanted them in their arsenals, 
France leaders believe that nuclear 
weapons are the modern symbol of 
power, prestige, and scientific 
expertise.  
Thus, for France to regain its 
international standing in the modern 
world, France must indubitably have 
nuclear weapons. This situation was 
exacerbated by the fact that all 
nuclear powers were not stopping 
advancing its nuclear capabilities. 
This makes the division of the haves 
(the nuclear powers) and the have-
nots (France and others) widened.  
French leaders did not want 
France to be left behind. Equally 
important, all the nuclear powers 
were vigorously continuing to 
upgrade its stockpiles and thereby 
increasing the aura of prestige of 
having vast stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons.  
Consequently, having vast 
stockpiles of nuclear weapons was 
becoming a trademark of great 
powers. If France wants to be 
considered a (legitimate) great power, 
it follows that France too must have 
nuclear arsenals. 
Finally, as the new 
institutionalism literatures argue that 
modern institutions mimic each other, 
France (too) mimicked other great 
powers vis-à-vis their possession of 
nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1996).  It is 
also worth noting that excluding 
China, France was the only great 
western power in the Security Council 
that, at that juncture, did not have 
nuclear weapons. As such, French 
force de frappe needed to have 
nuclear weapons in order to be in the 
same (elite) league with other “big 
boys.”  
In summary, France’s 
decision to develop nuclear weapons 
was not primarily motivated by 
security concerns. Claims to be 
threatened by the SU’s conventional 
and unconventional forces and doubt 
of the U.S. security guaranty were 
only a litany of justification, and 
never the primary motivation of 
establishing nuclear program. On the 
other hand, restoring the nation’s 
grandeur and prestige in international 
standing were the primary motivation. 
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Conclusion and Lessons for 
Indonesia 
All the case studies above 
demonstrate that security concerns 
are not always the primary motivation 
for states to seek nuclear weapons. 
There are also other motivations that 
could surpass security motivation in 
influencing states’ decision to seek 
nuclear weapons.  
India’s case illustrates that 
security threat from China would not 
necessarily turned into triggering 
mechanism for a policy change vis-à-
vis the decision to seek nuclear 
weapons. Instead, domestic political 
considerations turned out to be the 
primary motivation.  
South Africa’s case 
underlines that obtaining 
international standing and advancing 
mining industry are the primary 
motivation, while the communist 
presence in Angola served as false 
justification.  
France’s case illuminates 
that restoring national grandeur and 
regaining prestige in the international 
community were France’s post-World 
War II raison d'état. Without a closer 
look at France’s domestic documents 
and pronouncements, and without 
knowing the fact that France had 
already started its nuclear program 
two years before the Suez Crisis, one 
could be misled to believe that SU’s 
threat to use nuclear forces against 
France was the catalyst for France’s 
decision to develop nuclear weapons.  
All in all, the cogency of the 
security model in explaining the 
primary motivation for states to seek 
nuclear weapons is not always 
tenable. The security model, like any 
other models, has its weakness; it 
(overly) focuses on the state level. 
Hence, it fails to look at the micro 
level—the intents and roles of elite 
decision makers as well as the 
domestic mood and political 
considerations. 
As a member of the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
Indonesia has agreed to forgo nuclear 
weapons since 1979. And as a 
signatory that has ratified the 
International Atomic Energy 
Agency’s (IAEA) Additional 
Protocol in 1999 and the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) in 2012, Indonesia has 
unequivocally continued to cement its 
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status as an upstanding member of the 
international nonproliferation regime.  
In addition, Indonesia is 
routinely the coordinator of 
disarmament for the Group of Non-
Aligned States (NAM), which 
constitutes over half of the states 
party to the NPT, thereby making 
Indonesia not only an important 
member of the NPT, but also a 
palpably staunch advocate of a 
nuclear-free world.  
As such, it is inconceivable 
for Indonesia to try to develop nuclear 
weapons, since it would mean 
breaking various international 
nonproliferation treaties and regimes 
of which it is a party, and, more 
importantly, tarnishing its long-
standing international reputation. In 
other words, it is almost guaranteed 
that, ceteris paribus, Indonesia will 
continue to play a leadership role in 
realizing the vision of a world without 
nuclear weapons (Lieggi, 2012).   
Moreover, an Indonesian 
diplomat specialized in 
nonproliferation and disarmament 
issues once stated that even a collapse 
of the international nonproliferation 
regime would not precipitate an 
Indonesian nuclear armaments 
program. He added that Indonesia 
would be more likely abide by 
preexisting international non-
proliferation norms and remain non-
nuclear (Indonesian diplomat, 2009.).   
Still, there are possible 
scenarios—albeit remote—that may 
influence Indonesia to develop 
nuclear weapons. If anything, 
previous discussions offer several 
reasons why states may decide to seek 
nuclear weapons.  
Accordingly, it is 
theoretically possible that one-day 
Indonesia will feel compelled to go 
nuclear due to security threats, 
deterrence doctrines, domestic 
considerations, desires to demonstrate 
regional dominance, or to simply join 
the “big boys.”  
Whatever the reason may be, 
it is crucial for the Indonesian 
government to understand completely 
the accompanying risks of embarking 
on such program, which may include 
international condemnation, 
significant loss of international 
standing including pariah status, 
international sanctions, heightened 
security tensions in the region, 
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precipitation of a regional arms race, 
or even outright attack by other states. 
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